China appears to be expanding its efforts to influence Uyghurs living in Türkiye. According to Prof. Dr. Abdulhamit Avşar, President of the East Turkestan Foundation, Beijing previously maintained contact with a limited number of people but is now trying to reach wider sections of the Uyghur community.
This change suggests that China’s strategy is moving beyond direct pressure on prominent activists. It may now involve a broader campaign aimed at students, businesspeople, community leaders, cultural organisations, journalists and families. The objective is not only to monitor Uyghurs but also to influence how the Uyghur issue is discussed in Türkiye.
Türkiye is particularly important because it hosts one of the world’s largest Uyghur communities outside China. The country shares strong historical, cultural and linguistic connections with Uyghurs. It has also traditionally served as a major centre for Uyghur political, religious and cultural activities. For Beijing, this makes Türkiye both a challenge and an important target for influence.
From limited contacts to wider engagement
Avşar’s statement indicates that Chinese officials may be attempting to expand their contact network inside the Uyghur community. Such engagement can appear in different forms, including cultural events, educational programmes, business relations, official invitations, community contacts and visits to China.
On the surface, these activities may be presented as friendship or cultural exchange. However, researchers have warned that such initiatives can also be used to promote Beijing’s preferred narrative about Xinjiang and reduce criticism of China.
A recent analysis by Uyghur Rights Monitor described China’s influence operations in Türkiye as a “coordinated, multi-layered system.” It said Beijing seeks to shape political discussion, institutional behaviour and public attitudes toward Uyghur rights. Another report by the Jamestown Foundation identified propaganda and United Front work as tools used to legitimise China’s policies in Xin jiang and influence debate in Türkiye.
Controlling the public narrative
One major goal of the new strategy appears to be narrative control. China wants the international community to view Xinjiang as peaceful, prosperous and secure. At the same time, it seeks to present Uyghur activism as separatism, extremism or an obstacle to relations between Türkiye and China.
Middle East Eye reported that China has increased public-relations activities in Türkiye and has invited journalists and influential figures to visit China. The report from Middle East Eye, some visitors were taken to Xinjiang on carefully organised trips where they saw an official version of life in the region.
Such visits can provide access to selected locations and carefully prepared presentations, while restricting contact with families affected by detention, surveillance or forced assimilation. The danger is that a controlled visit may be used to challenge survivor testimony without allowing independent investigation.
Pressuring Uyghurs through their families
Another important element is pressure through relatives who remain in China. Uyghur activists in Türkiye have reported threats and intimidation connected to their families in Xinjiang. A Safeguard defenders report said Chinese police have used information about Uyghurs living in Türkiye, together with fear for relatives in China, to pressure people into stopping activism, producing pro-China propaganda or spying on other Uyghurs.
Radio Free Asia reported that Chinese officials used digital platforms such as WeChat and Douyin to manipulate Uyghurs’ family connections and attempt to turn them into informants.
This method is powerful because it allows Beijing to reach people without arresting them in Türkiye. An activist may be physically safe but still fear that parents, siblings or children could face punishment. As a result, many people may censor themselves or withdraw from public life.
Why the strategy matters
China’s objective may be to weaken the organised Uyghur diaspora, reduce criticism inside Türkiye and prevent the emergence of a strong public campaign on Uyghur rights. It may also seek to make Chinese political and economic influence more acceptable to Turkish institutions, media organisations and political parties.
Human Rights Watch has warned that Uyghurs in Türkiye have become less secure as Türkiye-China relations have grown closer. Its report documented concerns involving restriction codes, detention and pressure to sign voluntary return documents.
This does not mean every contact between Chinese officials and Uyghurs is automatically an intelligence operation. Evidence must be assessed carefully. But the broader pattern deserves public scrutiny.
Protecting Uyghur freedom in Türkiye
Türkiye has a responsibility to ensure that Uyghurs can live, organise and speak freely without intimidation. Economic cooperation with China should not come at the cost of human rights or freedom of expression.
The new strategy described by Avşar appears designed to move beyond a small number of direct contacts and reach the wider Uyghur community. Its success would depend on making Beijing’s narrative appear normal, isolating activists and turning family connections into tools of control.
For that reason, Turkish authorities, journalists, civil-society organisations and the public must demand transparency. Uyghurs in Türkiye should be able to decide their own future, preserve their identity and speak about Doğu Türkistan without fear.