On 1 July 2026, a law will come into force in China that deserves the world’s full attention. The Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress, passed on 12 March 2026 by the National People’s Congress with 2,756 votes in favuor and just three against, is presented by Beijing as an instrument of national harmony and shared prosperity. In reality, it is a carefully constructed legal mechanism designed to accelerate the assimilation of China’s 55 officially recognised ethnic minorities into the dominant Han Chinese identity. For Tibetans, Uyghurs, Southern Mongolians and others, this law does not open a door to progress. It closes the last doors that remained.
A Law Long in the Making
This legislation did not emerge in a vacuum. Its roots lie in a deliberate shift in Chinese policy, accelerating sharply since President Xi Jinping came to power, away from even a nominal recognition of minority autonomy and toward what Chinese academics have called “de-ethnicization”, the systematic dismantling of institutional distinctions between ethnic groups. The 2026 law is the national expression of policies already road-tested at the regional level: a comparable measure was introduced in Yunnan province in 2010, and a “model” version was applied to the Tibet Autonomous Region in 2020. What is new is the scale. These measures are now binding obligations across all of China.
The law mandates the promotion of a “strong sense of community of the Chinese nation” in every sphere of public life government institutions, schools, workplaces and social organisations. Mandarin Chinese is established as the language of instruction and official communication, directly reducing the space for Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian and other minority languages that have sustained distinct cultures for centuries
When Education Becomes Erasure
Language is not an administrative technicality. It is the medium through which culture, history and identity are transmitted from one generation to the next. A 2021 report by Human Rights Watch estimated that over one million Tibetan children are currently enrolled in state-run boarding schools, where instruction is conducted almost exclusively in Mandarin and where the surrounding environment is heavily shaped by Communist Party ideology. These children are, in many cases, separated from their families and communities at a formative age. The consequence is not incidental: fluency in Tibetan among younger generations is in documented and measurable decline.
This is not the ordinary challenge of integrating a diverse population into a modern state. Under Article II(e) of the United Nations Genocide Convention, the forcible transfer of children away from their cultural group is explicitly identified as an act of genocide. Eight UN Special Rapporteurs raised precisely this concern in a formal letter to Beijing on 16 April 2026, warning that the law risks entrenching policies with “serious implications for the linguistic, cultural and religious autonomy” of Tibetans, Uyghurs, Mongols and others.
The Long Arm of Article 63 The law’s most internationally significant provision is Article 63, which extends Beijing’s jurisdiction beyond China’s borders. It authorises the prosecution of individuals or organisations anywhere in the world for acts deemed to “undermine ethnic unity” or “create ethnic division.” The language is deliberately imprecise. A Tibetan academic in Paris, a Uyghur journalist in Stockholm or an NGO worker in Brussels who documents and criticises Beijing’s policies could, under this provision, be exposed to legal action.
Thousands of European citizens of Tibetan origin face the more immediate risk of arbitrary arrest or detention should they travel to China or Tibet.
This is not theoretical. Freedom House’s annual Transnational Repression Index consistently ranks China among the world’s most aggressive states in targeting dissidents abroad. Unofficial Chinese “police stations” have been documented in the Netherlands, Spain and Ireland, operating without diplomatic authorisation to monitor and pressure diaspora communities. Article 63 does not create this infrastructure. It legitimises it
What the International Community Has Said and What It Must Do
The international response has been notable, if not yet sufficient. In April 2026, the European Parliament adopted a resolution expressing “grave concern” over a law it described as one that “openly promotes assimilation policies,” calling for its repeal. The Tibetan Government in Exile condemned the legislation and called on the international community to monitor its implementation closely. Eight UN experts wrote formally to Beijing, citing potential violations of China’s own Constitution alongside its international treaty obligations.
Declarations, however, must now give way to action. The European Union should appoint a Special Representative for Tibet as it has done for the Middle East Peace Process and the Sahel to ensure a coordinated European response and to prevent Beijing from pursuing its established strategy of dividing EU member states on Tibet-related questions. The EU’s Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, introduced in 2021, should be applied to officials directly responsible for implementing this law and every EU member state must take concrete steps to identify and shut down any unofficial Chinese operations on their territory targeting diaspora communities.